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McELROY LECTURE
No Law Respecting the Practice of Religion
LESLIE C. GRIFFIN*
Thank you for giving me the honor of presenting the Phillip McElroy
Lecture at the University of Detroit Mercy. I deeply admire the two
founding traditions of your University: the Society of Jesus and the Sisters
of Mercy. Long before I became a lawyer I admired the writings of the late
Jesuit John Courtney Murray, who taught Roman Catholics to value the
First Amendment and to read their own tradition historically, not literally.
My late colleague in moral theology, Richard A. McCormick, S.J., was a
proud member of the Detroit Province of the Society. At Yale my doctoral
advisor was Sister of Mercy Margaret Farley, a University of Detroit
alumna, former professor and current member of the Board of Trustees. I
appreciate the opportunity you have provided for me to honor them as well
as Phillip McElroy, who received four degrees from UDM-B.S. '25,
LL.B.'29, LL.M. '30 and LL.D. '32-and, upon his death in 1993,
generously remembered the University by funding this excellent lecture
series.
From the Jesuits and the Sisters of Mercy I learned the important
lesson that religions are living traditions, not ideas set in stone for all times
and places, but vital traditions that must respond to human experience as
they seek the best way to promote the dignity of the human person. The
same is true of legal and constitutional traditions. The challenge in writing
about religion and law, combined, is the difficulty of considering not one,
but two, living traditions, and how they are appropriately joined.
We could spend this entire evening debating just that point, namely,
what a living tradition is, which legal and religious scholars or Supreme
Court Justices favor the concept, and who would be opposed. Certainly,
for example, we could expect Justice Antonin Scalia to insist it is NOT a
living Constitution, indeed, to deride the very concept, and he would be
joined by many other constitutional interpreters who favor theories of
original meaning or original intent. Instead of debating that point,
however, tonight I will explain instead how First Amendment religion case
law might have developed if the Court had followed the idea of living
traditions in its First Amendment jurisprudence.
* Larry & Joanne Doherty Chair in Legal Ethics, University of Houston Law Center,
Igriffin@uh.edu.
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As background to that lecture, however, and so that you may
understand my starting point, I provide a brief summary of why I advocate
living traditions and what I learned from theology and law about what a
living tradition protects. Taking a static or non-living view of traditions
can perpetuate old wrongs (like slavery or inequality); exclude new
members of the community from participation; create new harms that were
unanticipated in the past; and lead to senseless extremes instead of
moderate middle positions. All of these problems arose at one point or
another in the Supreme Court's non-living interpretations of the First
Amendment.
The First Amendment states "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."
These two religion clauses, Establishment and Free Exercise, appear to
stand in some tension with one another, and pose a difficult challenge to
any constitutional interpreter. Nonetheless, it is no exaggeration to write
that, in contrast to many other areas of the law, the modem First
Amendment jurisprudence of the last sixty years is a special mess, full of
inconsistencies and odd outcomes that have led many writers figuratively
to throw up their hands in despair over the possibility of offering a coherent
account of religious freedom. Consider the titles of two recent books about
constitutional law and religion: Frank Ravitch's Masters of Illusion and
Winnifred Fallers Sullivan's The Impossibility of Religious Freedom.' The
former challenges the Justices' capacity to offer a fair interpretation of the
Constitution, while the latter argues that the reality and complexity of lived
religion render it impossible for courts to define and protect religion in an
acceptable manner. Challenges such as Ravitch's and Sullivan's are
recurrently met with defenses of a non-living tradition that focuses on the
needs of the Founders' era while paying insufficient attention to our own.
The status of religion law is thus reminiscent of theologian H. Richard
Niebuhr's warning that Christians who fear pluralism and change "can
become nihilists and consistent skeptics who affirm that nothing can be
relied upon; or they can flee to the authority of some relative position,
affirming that a church, or a philosophy, or a value, like that of life for the
self, is absolute."3 The quest of living traditions is to avoid both such
extremes.
The world's living religions are examples of what the philosopher
John Rawls calls comprehensive doctrines.4  Philosophies (like
Utilitarianism, Kantianism, or Atheism), as well as religions (like
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. FRANK RAVITCH, MASTERS OF ILLUSION: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE RELIGION
CLAUSES (2007); WINNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM (2005).
3. H. RICHARD NIEBUHR, CHRIST AND CULTURE 238 (1st Harper Torchbook ed.,
Harper & Row 1956) (1951).
4. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 58 (1993).
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Christianity, Islam, or Buddhism), are comprehensive doctrines. I envision
comprehensive doctrines as big circles that include many ideas governing
all aspects of life. Religions and philosophies, after all, provide their
adherents with ultimate ideas about the purpose of life and death;
fundamental teachings about marriage, family, reproduction, and morality;
myths and doctrines that explain life's origins; and blueprints for how to
live, including what to eat and how to worship. One small part of that big
circle is what comparative religion scholar Ninian Smart labeled the
"practical and ritual dimension" of religion: "Every tradition has some
practices to which it adheres-for instance regular worship, preaching,
prayers, and so on. They are often known as rituals (though they may well
be more informal than this word implies)." 5  Such rituals, from Catholic
mass to Bible reading or yoga and meditation, are one of the essential
characteristics of religion.6 Although essential, however, they need not be
exclusive: there are many aspects of religions other than the practical and
ritual dimension.7
My question tonight is to ask what would First Amendment
jurisprudence look like if the Court held that the Religion Clauses apply to
that little circle of practical and ritual dimension, but not to the whole
comprehensive doctrine. The lecture begins in Part I with the
Establishment Clause, focusing on four perennial issues that have
consumed the Court's attention: prayer (in Part I.A), public religious
displays (in Part I.B), and aid to religious schools and organizations (in Part
I.C). Part I.D examines the religion-becomes-speech cases where the Court
ignored the Establishment Clause because it analyzed religious practice as
free speech rather than as free exercise. Then in Part II, I examine Free
Exercise. On each topic I provide a brief summary of how the law actually
developed, and then explain how it would look under my test.
An essential part of a living tradition is that it is not handed down
from on high and provided in absolute form, but instead arises from the
lived experience of the community. This point is consistent with the recent
emphasis in American constitutional law that constitutional interpretation is
a matter for the people and not just the courts.8 Accordingly, I provide you
with your own set of circles, so that you may decide what qualifies as the
practice of religion for First Amendment purposes. I also provide my own
filled-in circles so that you may participate in my thought experiment to see
if mine is a First Amendment you could accept. 9 As with any theory,
5. NINIAN SMART, THE WORLD'S RELIGIONS 13 (2d ed. 1998).
6. See id. at 13-14.
7. Id. at 14-21. The other dimensions are experiential and emotional; narrative or
mythic; doctrinal and philosophical; ethical and legal; social and institutional; material. Id.
8. See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).
9. See Figure 1.
HeinOnline  -- 85 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 477 2007-2008
478 UNIVERSITY OF DETROIT MERCY LAW REVIEW (Vol. 85:475
although some points in the circles are crystal clear, a few topics straddle
the line between the little circle and the big.
I. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of the
practice of religion .... 10
A. Prayer
I begin with the easiest subject, prayer, which is a quintessential
religious practice. Most of the case law reflects my intuition that the
government should not be involved in the religious practice of prayer.
Going back to 1962, when the Court ruled in the Engel case from New
York that the Regents prayer should not be recited in public school
classrooms;1" and forward to the Pennsylvania Schemp case, striking
down a law requiring Bible reading in public schools;' to the Alabama
case invalidating moment of silence legislation because it was clear the
legislature was sponsoring prayer, not silence; 13 to the Rhode Island case
disallowing a "nonsectarian" invocation by a rabbi at a public high school
graduation;' 4 and finally in 2000 to the rejection of prayer before high
school football games in Texas, 15 the Court has well understood the basic
point that the government should not participate in the practice of religion.
As later sections of this talk confirm, however, although the Court reached
the right results in these cases, the prayer rulings nonetheless participate in
the jumble of Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Instead of my singular
practice of religion test, the Justices have applied different tests to limit
prayer, intermittently relying on the secular purpose, endorsement and
coercion tests, or asking if a government or student speaker participated,
seeing those issues as much more determinative than whether the practice
of religion was involved.
Within this string of prayer cases, one stands out as conspicuously
wrong under my practice of religion test, namely the 1983 decision in
Marsh v. Chambers, which held that the Nebraska Legislature could
constitutionally begin each session with prayers offered by a chaplain paid
by the State. 6 The Court upheld the practice even though only one
Presbyterian minister had been chaplain since 1965, and his prayers were
exclusively Judeo-Christian, offering the odd conclusion that one cannot
10. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
11. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
12. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
13. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
14. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
15. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
16. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
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"perceive any suggestion that choosing a clergyman of one denomination
advances the beliefs of a particular church." 1
7
The Court's reasoning in Marsh relied on a historical practice;
because the first Congress had chaplains, concluded Chief Justice Warren
Burger, it could not be unconstitutional, two hundred years later, for a state
legislature to do the same. The facts of Marsh, with the legislature's
preference for one type of minister and a limited range of prayers,
demonstrate the limits of a Constitution of non-living original practice.
One of the most significant changes in the United States since its origins is
the incredible diversity of its religious population; it is now the most
religiously pluralistic nation in the world. Ironically, the years at issue in
Marsh, from 1965 to 1983, witnessed extensive immigration of new
citizens of non-Christian and non-European backgrounds.18  Basing the
rules about religion on the practice of the Founders excludes a wide swath
of religions and philosophies from constitutional protection.
A living constitutional tradition does not permit the Court to stick with
exclusionary practices of the past or to offer a historical exception to the
Establishment Clause. Although Marsh is often viewed as a limited
precedent, it continues to cause trouble. In 2007 a Hindu priest, Rajan Zed,
was invited to offer prayers in the U.S. Senate, and protesters interrupted
him by loudly asking for God's forgiveness for allowing the "abomination"
of Hindu prayer in the Senate chamber.' 9 Contrary to Marsh's avoidance
of the favoritism to Christianity present in legislative prayer, in reality
religions are distinctive living traditions, which each have their own
prayers and rituals. The government may not participate in some without
excluding others. There should be no historical exception to the rule that
government should not become involved in religious practice.
One other ritual forms an important part of American life. Since the
1940s challenges to the constitutionality of the recitation of the Pledge of
Allegiance in public schools have been issued as freedom of speech
rulings, as the Court recognized that the government may not force students20
to pledge allegiance to the flag because of free speech. Considering
religious rituals and the practice of religion, however, suggests that
pledging allegiance "under God" turns the pledge into a religious ritual
akin to a prayer. From that perspective, it should be a Free Exercise
17. Id. at 793.
18. Rhys H. Williams, The Languages of the Public Sphere: Religious Pluralism,
Institutional Logics, and Civil Society, 612 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. Sci. 42, 44-46
(2007).
19. Michelle Boorstein, Hindu Groups Ask '08 Hopefuls to Criticize Protest, WASH.
POST, July 27, 2007, at A4.
20. See generally Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940); W. Va. State
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (the pledges in these two cases did not
include the words "under God"); Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1
(2004) (father had no standing to raise "under God" Establishment challenge).
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violation for the government to ask students to recite the version of the
pledge that includes "under God," and an Establishment violation for
school teachers to lead its recitation. Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of the practice of religion or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof.
B. Public Religious Displays
In a 1980 case, Stone v. Graham, the Court held that Kentucky could
not require posting of the Ten Commandments on the classroom wall.21
The ruling was direct and the reasoning straightforward: the state lacked a
secular purpose for its actions and therefore violated the Establishment
Clause.2
The 5-4 vote in Stone v. Graham portended trouble ahead. Later in
the 1980s, the secular purpose test was stretched to include religious
symbols when the Court heard two cases about Christmas-well, holiday-
displays. In Pawtucket, Rhode Island, the city park's display included a
nativity scene surrounded by a Santa Claus house, reindeer, a Christmas
tree, candy-striped poles, a clown, an elephant, a teddy bear and other
items. 23 In ruling that the display was constitutional, Chief Justice Burger
followed the historical precedent of Marsh, arguing that the government
had always accommodated religion and could do so in Pawtucket.
Overruling the district court, moreover, the Chief Justice concluded that
Pawtucket had "legitimate secular purposes" for its display, namelyr "to
celebrate the Holiday . . . and to depict the origins of that Holiday." In
concurrence, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor introduced her influential
endorsement test, according to which the display is judged by whether a
reasonable observer would believe that the government had endorsed
religion. "Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are
outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored
members of the political community," wrote Justice O'Connor, and
therefore such endorsement violates the Establishment Clause.25
Following Justice O'Connor's lead, in a subsequent display case the
Court ruled that a freestanding creche in a county courthouse was
unconstitutional, while a display of a menorah next to a Christmas tree and
a sign of liberty was constitutional. Deriding O'Connor's endorsement
test, Justice Anthony Kennedy found both displays constitutional,
proposing in place of endorsement the coercion test, according to which the
"government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in any
21. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
22. Id. at 41.
23. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 671 (1984).
24. Id. at 669.
25. Id. at 688.
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religion or its exercise. ' ,2 6 Although Kennedy later used that coercion test
to invalidate the high school graduation prayers in Rhode Island, he found
the public displays of religion uncoercive and therefore constitutional.
Since then, state and local governments have followed the clown or
reindeer or Christmas tree rule, sprinkling their religious displays with
enough secular symbols to pass constitutional muster. This result has been
deeply unsatisfactory to many religious people who believe that the mix of
secular and religious symbols trivializes the practice of religion.2 7 As the
dissenting Justices had pointed out in the Pawtucket case, Lynch v.
Donnelly, the creche represents not a commercial public holiday, but the
central religious event of Christianity: the birth of its Founder, the Son of
God, Jesus Christ. The creche is a symbol of that event as well as part of
the ritual of honoring the Founder's birthday at Christmas. In similar
fashion, the menorah was used in the ancient Temple as part of the
Hanukkah ritual. Both the creche and menorah are a significant part of the
ritual of religion and therefore should not be sponsored by the government.
The sprinkling-of-secular-with-religious-symbols approach to public
religion has also been applied to cure Ten Commandments displays, which,
as noted above, were held unconstitutional in 1980 because they lack a
secular purpose. After the American Civil Liberties Union challenged
gold-framed copies of the Ten Commandments hung in the McCreary and
Pulaski County Kentucky courthouses, the Counties passed a resolution
asserting that the Commandments are the basis of state law and
surrounding the displays with eight other documents, namely:
the "endowed by their Creator" passage from the Declaration of
Independence; the Preamble to the Constitution of Kentucky; the
national motto, "In God We Trust"; a page from the
Congressional Record of February 2, 1983, proclaiming the Year
of the Bible and including a statement of the Ten
Commandments; a proclamation by President Abraham Lincoln
designating April 30, 1863, a National Day of Prayer and
Humiliation; an excerpt from President Lincoln's "Reply to
Loyal Colored People of Baltimore upon Presentation of a
Bible," reading that "[t]he Bible is the best gift God has ever
given to man"; a proclamation by President Reagan marking
1983 the Year of the Bible; and the Mayflower Compact.28
A third display included "nine framed documents of equal size," the Ten
Commandments, along with the "Magna Carta, the Declaration of
26. County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 659
(1989).
27. STEVEN GOLDBERG, BLEACHED FAITH: THE TRAGIC COST WHEN RELIGION IS
FORCED INTO THE PUBLIC SQUARE 44 (2008).
28. McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 854 (2005) (alteration in original)
(citations omitted).
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Independence, the Bill of Rights, the lyrics of the Star Spangled Banner,
the Mayflower Compact, the National Motto, the Preamble to the Kentucky
Constitution, and a picture of Lady Justice.,
29
In Austin, Texas, on the state capitol grounds, a Ten Commandments
monument was part of a state park that also included monuments of the
Heroes of the Alamo, Hood's Brigade, Confederate Soldiers, Volunteer
Fireman, Terry's Texas Rangers, Texas Cowboy, Spanish-American War,
Texas National Guard, Tribute to Texas School Children, Texas Pioneer
Woman, The Boy Scouts' Statue of Liberty Replica, Pearl Harbor
Veterans, Korean War Veterans, Soldiers of World War I, Disabled
Veterans, and Texas Peace Officers. o
In mixed decisions, by 5-4 votes, and relying on an assortment of
Establishment Clause tests, the Court invalidated the Kentucky display and
upheld the Texas monument. According to Justice David Souter, the
displays lacked a secular purpose; to Justice O'Connor, both endorsed
religion; Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized their passive nature; Justice
Scalia used a historical argument to conclude that the government may
favor religion generally; Justice Thomas found the displays consistent with
the Constitution's original meaning; and Justice John Paul Stevens wrote
that the displays sent an "unmistakably Judeo-Christian message of
piety. ' 31 The swing voter, Justice Stephen Breyer, voted against the
Kentucky displays but upheld the Texas monument because it would be
more divisive to tear it down than to leave it standing.
The practice of religion test is much more straightforward. The Ten
Commandments are a quintessentially religious text, given by God to
Moses as part of a covenant, and recorded in the Hebrew Bible's Book of
Exodus. 32  "The first four Commandments . . . deal with Israel's
obligations to YHWH. 33 Over the centuries, those commandments have
been interpreted and reinterpreted by numerous Jewish and Christian
groups, who number, order, and translate the commandments differently.
34
All the Ten Commandments cases that have come to the Supreme Court
involve variants of the King James Version of the Commandments, which
suggests that one religion-Protestant Christianity-is generally favored
over others, as it was in Marsh. Therefore, the government should not
establish the practice of religion and should not sponsor Ten
Commandments displays.
29. Id. at 855-56.
30. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681 n.1 (2005).
31. Id. at 720.
32. There are several versions within Exodus, and there is another version in
Deuteronomy. See GOLDBERG, supra note 27, at 9-10.
33. JOHN J. COLLINS, INTRODUCTION TO THE HEBREW BIBLE 127 (2004).
34. See generally WILLIAM P. BROWN, THE TEN COMMANDMENTS: THE RECIPROCITY
OF FAITHFULNESS (2004).
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How shall we address Justice Breyer's serious concern that the
destruction of historical monuments such as the Ten Commandments
arouses division and animosity among citizens and supports the perception
that the Court is anti-religious? The practice of religion test requires
honesty that the Ten Commandments are religious documents, not secular
sources of law. If they stand, they must be surrounded by comparable
religious texts such as the Qur-an or the Bhagavad Gita, not the
Constitution and the Declaration of Independence. 35 A living tradition may
not exclude new members from participation by ignoring their sacred
symbols while sponsoring others. It would be interesting to see if public
displays of the Ten Commandments remained as popular if surrounding the
Ten Commandments with non-Christian religious texts were the
constitutional requirement.
C. Public Aid to Religion
By far the most confusing legacy of the Court's Establishment Clause
jurisprudence occurred in the area of government aid to religious
institutions, where the case law proves that an unyielding formula is as
harmful to constitutional interpretation as the unchanging history of Marsh.
The modern aid cases began in 1947 with the famous Everson case, when
the Court upheld a New Jersey program to reimburse parents for bus
transportation of their children to and from school, including religious
schools.36  Although the parents won that case, the decision's wording
included two features that posed recurring difficulties for the next sixty
years: first was the majority's proclamation of the wall of separation
between church and state, a standard that quickly became an unliving
constitutional test that was used to exclude some religions, especially
Catholicism, from equal treatment; 37 second was Justice Hugo Black's
characterization of the involved schools, primarily Roman Catholic
parochial schools, as "church schools. '38 With that expression, the Court
ignored the actual practice of the schools, preferring their dead
characterization to appropriate analysis of life in the schools. Over the next
sixty years, the static formulations led the Court to senseless extremes
instead of moderate middle positions as well as perpetuated old rivalries
between religious traditions, especially Protestants and Catholics.
Consider first the terminology of "church schools." In terms of my
circles, 39 according to Justice Black's opinion, a Catholic school was the
35. This was done on a street corner in Mission Viejo, California. See Wade Clark
Roof, Pluralism as a Culture: Religion and Civility in Southern California, 612 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. Sci. 82, 82 (2007).
36. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
37. See PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (2002) (tracing anti-
Catholic sources of separationism).
38. Everson, 330 U.S. at 3.
39. See Figure 1.
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same as a church or a religion, the big circle, and therefore everything that
went on inside the school was perceived as the practice of religion. Adding
the religious formula, "church schools," to the legal standard, "separation
of church and state," suggested that every attempt to assist those schools
was the same as establishing a church. 40 From that perspective, it is easy to
understand why busing survived constitutional scrutiny; busing takes place
beyond the reach of church-school authorities. After Everson, however, the
formula failed dramatically when state and federal legislatures repeatedly
attempted to place aid inside the schoolhouse door.
It could take us a full semester to work through the details of all those
cases, so consider instead Justice William Rehnquist's summary of the
crazy patchwork of post-Everson aid cases:
For example, a State may lend to parochial school children
geography textbooks that contain maps of the United States, but
the State may not lend maps of the United States for use in
geography class. A State may lend textbooks on American
colonial history, but it may not lend a film on George
Washington, or a film projector to show it in history class. A
State may lend classroom workbooks, but may not lend
workbooks in which the parochial school children write, thus
rendering them nonreusable. A State may pay for bus
transportation to religious schools but may not pay for bus
transportation from the parochial school to the public zoo or
natural history museum for a field trip. A State may pay for
diagnostic services conducted in the parochial school but
therapeutic services must be given in a different building; speech
and hearing "services" conducted by the State inside the sectarian
school are forbidden, but the State may conduct speech and
hearing diagnostic testing inside the sectarian school.
Exceptional parochial school students may receive counseling,
but it must take place outside of the parochial school, such as in a
trailer parked down the street. A State may give cash to a
parochial school to pay for the administration of state-written
tests and state-ordered reporting services, but it may not provide
funds for teacher-prepared tests on secular subjects. Religious
instruction may not be given in public school, but the public
school may release students during the day for religion classes
elsewhere, and may enforce attendance at those classes with its
truancy laws.41
40. Id. at 24 (aid to school is "indistinguishable" from aid to Church).
41. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 110-11 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted).
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Moreover, at the same time, the Court prohibited the funding of
secular subjects in religious schools while upholding the constitutionality
of religious worship on public school grounds.
Within this line of cases, several are especially noteworthy. Most
famous, or notorious, is Lemon v. Kurtzman,4T which provided the three-
part Lemon test that the Court has used so frequently to decide
Establishment Clause cases. 4  In the facts of Lemon, Rhode Island
provided a 15% salary supplement to teachers in religious schools who
would teach only courses offered in public schools, using only public
school materials. Pennsylvania reimbursed religious schoolteachers for
their salaries for secular courses, as well as for secular textbooks and
materials approved by the state. Although the programs met the first two
prongs of the Lemon test-they were passed with a secular purpose and did
not advance or inhibit religion-the Court ruled that the excessive
entanglement of church and state in the state's oversight of the materials
violated the Establishment Clause.
The Court invoked Lemon in Aguilar v. Felton45 when it invalidated a
federal program that sent New York public schoolteachers into religious
schools to provide remedial education to disadvantaged children after an
original plan to bus parochial schoolchildren to public schools was rejected
for reasons of safety. The safer plan of moving the teachers instead of the
children was rejected because of Lemon's entanglement prong. The Court
nullified the program even though the public school teachers were trained
by the state, and were merely teaching what they usually taught in public
school in a classroom stripped of religious symbols. Even though the
public school teachers were within the boundaries of the religious school,
no practice of religion was involved.
Because of Lemon and Aguilar, the Satmar Hasidic Jewish children of
New York could no longer receive their remedial education in their
religious schools. In response, their parents, with the aid of the New York
legislature, then created the Village of Kiryas Joel Public School District,
which was ruled unconstitutional because of the religious gerrymander of
forming a school district based on religious identity.46 Also due to Aguilar,
New York, at great expense, placed vans and "mobile instructional units"
outside the religious schools to hold the public remedial educators. Justice
Black's combination of "church schools" and "separation of church and
state" had reached its apex: any instruction within a religious school, even
42. Compare Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 602 (1971), with Widmar v. Vincent,
454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981).
43. 403 U.S. 602.
44. First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute
must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion. Id. at 612-13.
45. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
46. Bd. ofEduc. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
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remedial education by trained public schoolteachers, violated the
Establishment Clause.
The Supreme Court eventually overruled Aguilar in Agostini v. Felton,
with some Justices complaining that Aguilar was hostile to religion.47
Instead of reclaiming the middle ground, however, the Court soon swung
back to the other extreme end of the Establishment Clause spectrum. Three
years after Aguilar was overruled, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a
plurality opinion in Mitchell v. Helms upholding a federal law providing
library books, computers, computer software, slide and movie projectors,
overhead projectors, television sets, tape recorders, VCRs, projection
screens, laboratory equipment, maps, globes, filmstrips, slides and cassette• 48
recordings to public and religious schools. Although the result seemed
reasonable, Thomas' reasoning was risky; he concluded that the aid was
neutral, and therefore constitutional, solely because it was provided to both
religious and public schools. In sharp contrast to Justice Black, who
believed that everything occurring in the church schools was religious,
Justice Thomas' opinion ignored the possibility that some government aid
might be used to support the practice of religion and seemed to recognize
no limits on government aid to religion. Justice O'Connor's concurrence
warned the plurality that its reasoning permitted "actual diversion of
government aid to religious indoctrination. '49  Post-Mitchell, the Court
upheld, on similar reasoning, a vouchers program that gave tuition aid to
parents of religious schoolchildren rather than directly to the schools. 5
There is some reason to believe that the Court will not allow funding
of the practice of religion; in 2004 it upheld against constitutional challenge
a Washington State program that financed general student scholarships
while refusing to spend state money to assist the study of devotional
theology or ministry." This decision was correct; as the group specifically
ordained to practice religion, the ministry's training should not be
sponsored by the government.
With Justice O'Connor's retirement from the Court, and the expansion
of aid to religious institutions during the administrations of Presidents Bill
Clinton and George W. Bush, 52 it is possible that the Court, following
Justice Thomas's lead and ignoring Justice O'Connor's warnings, will
47. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 236 (1997).
48. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
49. Id. at 837.
50. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
51. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
52. See 42 U.S.C. § 604a; Exec. Order No. 13,199, 3 C.F.R. 752-54 (2001), reprinted
in 5 U.S.C. 601 app. at 597 (2006); Exec. Order No. 13,198, 3 C.F.R. 750-52 (2001),
reprinted in 5 U.S.C. 601 app. at 752-53 (2006); Exec. Order No. 13,280, 3 C.F.R. 262-64
(2002), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. 601 app. at 756 (2006); Exec. Order No. 13,342, 3 C.F.R. 180-
81 (2004), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. 601 app. at 756 (2006); Exec. Order No. 13,397, 3 C.F.R.
214-15 (2006), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. 601 app. at 758-59 (2006).
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approve public financing of the practice of religion.5 3  Some drug and
alcohol counselors promote belief in Jesus Christ as the most effective
solution to addiction, while prison programs like InnerChange teach that
prayer and Bible reading will reform prisoners' hearts and minds and lessen
recidivism. Their sponsors often demand equal aid for these religious
practices. Such programs should not receive government funding; the
government should not aid the practice of religion. We face the possibility,
however, that, with the vouchers precedent and the popularity of
government aid to faith-based organizations, the Court will create a new
harm unimaginable in the past: government provision of millions of pence
to the churches.54
The path of public aid to religion law could have been much
straighter. My interpretation of the Establishment Clause allows busing,
secular books, remedial courses by public school teachers in religious
schools, strictly secular courses by religious schoolteachers, computer and
other technical aid that is not diverted to religion, and welcomes
government monitoring to police the boundaries. My line of cases contains
no Lemon or Aguilar, and therefore no Kiryas Joel or Zelman. There
would be no vouchers movement and no wave of aid to faith-based
organizations. Both extremes of the no-aid and no-limits-to-aid spectrum
would have been avoided.
Taking a static or non-living view of traditions can perpetuate old
wrongs, exclude new members of the community from participation, lead
to senseless extremes instead of moderate middle positions, and create new
harms that were unanticipated in the past. The Court's aid to religion cases
contributed to all these ills by heightening tensions between public and
religious schools; excluding the new Catholic immigrants from equal
participation in neutral government programs; swinging from a no-aid to
no-limits-to-aid jurisprudence; and raising the specter of massive aid to
religion unimagined at our country's origins. The unevenness of the
treatment of religious practice is confirmed by the next set of cases, where
public schools received financial support for the practice of religion.
D. Religious Practice Becomes Speech
At the same time that the Court strictly prevented secular items from
being funded in religious schools, it decided the so-called "equal access"
53. Right now, the leading precedent on aid to FBO is Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S.
589 (1988), in which the Court upheld the Adolescent Family Life Act's provision of grants
to religious counseling services, but remanded for a determination by the district court
whether the recipients were pervasively sectarian and involved in religious activities. The
pervasively sectarian standard was abolished in Mitchell, however, and a new Court may
provide a new FBO test.
54. The million pence is a play on "three pence" from JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL
AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS (1785), reprinted in BROOKE
ALLEN, MORAL MINORITY: OUR SKEPTICAL FOUNDING FATHERS 191, 193 (2006).
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cases in the public schools. The first case arose at the University of
Missouri, which made its facilities available to a number of student groups
but did not allow the rooms to be used for "religious worship or religious
teaching., 55  When Cornerstone, a religious group whose meetings
included the practice of religion-namely, prayer, hymns, and Bible
reading-sued to use the school's rooms, the district court wisely ruled that
the Establishment Clause permitted the university's policy. That holding
was consistent with my reasoning that public facilities should not be used
for the practice of religion. The Supreme Court, however, ruled that the
policy violated the free speech rights of the students because it was not
content-neutral; if philosophers used the classrooms to debate ideas,
according to Justice John Paul Stevens' concurrence, then churches must be
permitted entry as a matter of equality.
The Supreme Court's analysis ignored the distinctive status of the
practice of religion within the First Amendment. Dissenting Justice Byron
White understood that point when he wrote that the majority's analysis
"emptied [the Religion Clauses] of any independent meaning. ' 56 Justice
White shrewdly explained that the majority's decision left no way to
distinguish a university class practicing Sunday Mass from one about the
History of the Catholic Church. He observed, moreover, that the Court's
reasoning undermined the Ten Commandments case, Stone v. Graham, as
well as the prayer and Bible cases, Engel and Schempp.57
The Court has recurrently ignored Justice White's advice and repeated
its mistake several times in Widmar's misbegotten progeny, which
permitted Christian prayer clubs and Bible study groups to meet in
elementary and secondary public schools,58 and then required the
University of Virginia to fund a student publication titled Wide Awake,
whose purpose was to preach the Gospel of Jesus Christ and to convert
students to the Christian faith.5 9 Taken in conjunction with the aid cases,
the odd result was that religious proselytizing was permitted in the public
schools while secular remedial education was denied in the religious
schools.
Justice White wrote the unanimous decision for the one equal access
case that was appropriately decided on free speech rather than Free
Exercise grounds. The Center Moriches School District denied permission
to Lamb's Chapel, an evangelical church, to show a six-part film series
about family values from a Christian perspective after public school
hours.60 Other groups' presentations about the family were allowed. The
55. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 263 (1981).
56. Id. at 284 (White, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 286.
58. See Bd. of Educ. of the Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990);
Good News Club v. Milford Central Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001).
59. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
60. Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
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Court, finding that "all views about family issues and child rearing except
those dealing with the subject matter from a religious standpoint" were
allowed, correctly ruled for Lamb's Chapel.6' Showing movies about the
family is not the practice of religion, but instead offers a presentation of
ideas protected by the other First Amendment.
The next Free Exercise case confirms that family values are not the
practice of religion.
II. FREE EXERCISE
"or prohibiting the free exercise" of the practice of religion62
In 1879, the Supreme Court ruled that laws against polygamy did not
violate the free exercise rights of a Mormon man who contested his
prosecution for a second marriage on the grounds that he was acting out of
religious obligation.63 The Court's ruling that religious citizens must
usually obey the law (or, in other words, are not usually exempt from the
law because of their religion) is consistent with my theory. Although
religions set standards and norms for marriage and the family, marriage is
not the practice of religion. More than a century later, adult sexual privacy
(including, perhaps, polygamous relationships) enjoys some constitutional
protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
64
but polygamy and marriage do not fall within the protection of the First
Amendment. This argument, however, should cut both ways: the
government should not set marriage laws based on the idea that marriage is
sacred or religious.
In a controversial 1990 decision, Employment Division v. Smith,
Justice Antonin Scalia cited Reynolds (the polygamy case) when he wrote
for a 5-4 majority that Native American drug counselors who used peyote
in a religious ritual were not entitled to unemployment benefits because
they had broken a "neutral law of general applicability," namely the
criminal law against drug use.65 Although I agree with Justice Scalia's
strong restatement of Reynolds' rule that granting religious citizens
exemptions from the law would inappropriately "permit every citizen to
become a law unto himself, 66 peyote use differs from polygamy in my
understanding of free exercise. Peyote is part of the ritual practice of the
Native American religion and therefore should enjoy constitutional
protection, namely exemption from neutral laws of general applicability.
61. Id. at 393.
62. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
63. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
64. See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
65. Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879
(1990).
66. Id.
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Such exemptions should be a matter of constitutional requirement rather
than legislative grace.67
Under my reasoning, the Court's recent decision to protect access to a
hallucinogenic hoasca tea for members of a small Brazilian church was
correct,68 as was the assumption that Roman Catholic churches were
entitled to an exemption from Prohibition laws for their sacramental wine.
Because the rituals of death are also an essential part of the practice of
religion, the Court was wrong to allow the government to build roads over
the sacred burial sites of Native Americans. 69 When the City of Hialeah,
Florida, banned Santeria animal sacrifice, it also violated the practice of
religious ritual while permitting non-ritual slaughtering of animals.70
The Santeria case suggests that there should be some limits on the free
practice of religion; I would not like my standard to justify the Church of
Human Sacrifice's ritual. Therefore, religious practices that cause harm to
human persons fall outside Free Exercise protection. Accordingly,
religious parents' refusal of medical treatment for their children fails on
two counts: medicine is not the practice of religion and refusal causes
physical harm to the children. 7 Many readers will be disappointed to learn
that my standard undoes the most famous surviving religious exemption
case, Wisconsin v. Yoder, in which the Court exempted Amish parents from
obeying the compulsory school attendance laws for their children.72 Not
only is compulsory education not the practice of religion (as we learned
above in the Court's aid cases), there is also, as Justice William Douglas'
dissent in Yoder argued, a harm to children who are kept from school
because of their parents' but not their own desires:
If the parents in this case are allowed a religious exemption, the
inevitable effect is to impose the parents' notions of religious
duty upon their children. Where the child is mature enough to
express potentially conflicting desires, it would be an invasion of
the child's rights to permit such an imposition without canvassing
his views.73
67. See id. at 890 (explaining Justice Scalia's conclusion that legislatures, not courts,
should be the ones to grant religious exemptions from the law).
68. See generally Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546
U.S. 418 (2006).
69. See generally Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439
(1988).
70. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
71. For a compelling account of these cases, see SHAWN FRANCIS PETERS, WHEN
PRAYER FAILS: FAITH HEALING, CHILDREN, AND THE LAW (2008).
72. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
73. Id. at 242 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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Because Smith apparently changed the Court's test in the Free
Exercise area from strict scrutiny to a more relaxed standard of review,
7 4
the technical legal debate since Smith has involved questions about the
proper test for Free Exercise violations. My practice of religion test can
ignore the level of review. The pre-Smith, strict scrutiny line of cases
developed in the unemployment compensation benefits area in 1963 when
Adele Sherbert was denied unemployment benefits after she refused to
accept a job requiring work on Saturday, her Sabbath.75 The case is now
famous for its heightened level of scrutiny, namely that any law that
imposes a substantial burden on religion must meet the compelling state
interest test. I need not focus on the standard of review, however, for in my
test Sabbath observance is a core religious ritual that enjoys constitutional
protection, no matter what day of the week it occurs.
Under my test, therefore, Sherbert is entitled to her unemployment
compensation benefits, not because of strict scrutiny, but because the
state's burden is on the practice of her religion. However, of the three
unemployment cases that followed Sherbert, only two (Hobbie and Frazee)
are correct, as those two plaintiffs were also Sabbatarians who belonged to
less recognized religions than Sherbert. They demonstrate that Free
Exercise applies broadly, to a range of religions, popular and solitary.7 6
Thomas, however, a Jehovah's Witness who refused for moral reasons to
accept a transfer to the armament factory section of his employer, is not
entitled to unemployment compensation;77 although morality is a central
component of all religious traditions, and part of the big circle, it is not the
practice of religion.78
The Sabbatarian argument also cuts both ways. Sunday closing laws
should have been invalidated under the Establishment Clause because by
picking one Sabbath the state established the practice of religion.
Similarly, Jewish plaintiffs who challenged the Sunday closing laws
because their Sabbath was not Sunday should have won their Free Exercise
claims.79 Some employers may be unhappy with this standard; contrary to
Supreme Court precedent, they would be required to respect their
74. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) for a debate surrounding Smith
and its standard of review.
75. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
76. See generally Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136
(1987); Frazee v. I11. Dep't. of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989).
77. See generally Thomas v. Review Bd., Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707
(1981).
78. See SMART, supra note 5, at 18-19.
79. See generally McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (upholding Sunday
closing laws under Establishment Clause). See also Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown,
Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961) (law also upheld on Establishment grounds). For
free exercise cases see generally Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) and Gallagher v.
Crown Kosher Super Mkt. of Mass., Inc., 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
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employees' Sabbath of choice. 80 Employers would gain something from
my standard as well: their legal responsibility would be to accommodate
only the practice of religion.
One of the most difficult areas of employment law and religion has
been to determine when or if churches can be sued for discrimination on
the basis of race, gender or religion. Consider the identities of five original
plaintiffs against the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints in the
leading Title VII case, Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos. 81 Three were seamstresses
who manufactured temple garments; the named plaintiff, Christine Amos,
typed and processed insurance forms in the personnel department; and
Arthur Frank Mayson was a building engineer at a church gymnasium. All
five were fired because they did not have a temple recommend. My theory
permits the Church to be exempt from the anti-discrimination laws for
firing the seamstresses who prepared ritual garments (a core part of the
practice of religion), but, contrary to Supreme Court precedent, subjects the
church to suit by the secretary and the janitor.82 In similar fashion, I can
allow a ministerial exception that dismisses lawsuits for individuals
involved in the practice of religion, but allows even clergy to be sued for
non-religious conduct.
By now you know my standard and can apply it on your own to other
issues. Creation science? Studying the Bible with its creation stories is the
practice of religion, so the Supreme Court correctly decided the evolution
cases. 83 Tax exemptions? Churches receive them on the condition that• 84
they not endorse candidates. Should the clergy instead be permitted to
endorse candidates from the pulpit (where, of course, they practice the
rituals of their religion) but nowhere else? 85 Don't expect to hear any
prayers at the inauguration of our next president. And so forth. If I
continue to speak, my living test will start to die and you along with it. I
appreciate your generous attention and invoke the memory of Phillip
McElroy, who in death started this wonderful new and living tradition of
the McElroy lectures.
80. See generally Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
81. 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
82. My analysis is closer to the standard employed by the district court in Amos v.
Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 594 F. Supp. 791
(D. Utah 1984), rather than the Supreme Court's decision in Amos, 483 U.S. 327 where the
Supreme Court allowed Mayson to be fired even though he was a building engineer at a
gymnasium.
83. See generally Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); Edwards v. Aguillard,
482 U.S. 578 (1987).
84. 26 U.S.C. § 501(a), (c)(3) (2000).
85. Representative Walter Jones suggested pulpit protection in the Houses of Worship
Free Speech Restoration Act, H.R. 235, 108th Cong. § 2 (2003).
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FIGURE 1. THE PRACTICE OF RELIGION, REPRESENTED BY THE INNER
CIRCLE, IS ONLY PART OF RELIGIONS' COMPREHENSIVE BELIEFS, WHICH
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